Nhung Nguyen

Introduction
In spites of meeting some socio-economic indicators for democratic transition, it is likely that democratization in Vietnam is not a recent future. Being a communism country, Vietnam today can see itself in a somewhat similar situation of Poland at that time of its transition. Both countries have to face with the staleness of communist ideology, the frustration of people towards single party regime and the impacts of the global popularity of democracy. Moreover, democratic transition in Poland had not turned into a bloody revolution due to the attempts of involved political forces. Peaceful democratization is always preferable.

Similarly, some political forces in Vietnam today also seek to find a peaceful way to democratize the country. However, there are some significant political elements, which may result in the differences between Poland and Vietnam’s democratization (if it can be). Therefore, this paper aims to examine some political differences, which lead to the fact that Vietnam today might have not reached enough political conditions for democratization in comparison with Poland in the late 1980s.

Poland’s past: a mirror of the Vietnam’s present?
In 1980s, Soviet Union and Poland had to face with unprecedented difficulties in economy, society and politic. According to Borshchevskaya (2014), ordinary Soviet citizens no longer believe in the regime. The government could not fill the gap between the life of Soviet ideology promised and the life it actually delivered. Many people frustrated with poor economic conditions and the limitations of the authorities. In other word, “the resentments and conflicts of ideas led to an almost total collapse of belief in the old dominant, so-called socialist, or official Marxist ideology” (Sherman, 1994).

Being affected by the crisis of Soviet’s collapse, Vietnam state has timely kicked-off so-called Doi moi (Reform) since 1986, which has led to some positively fundamental changes of the socio-economic life. However, today the Vietnamese are likely to realize that the life promised by socialist leaders is different from their real life. Unstable price, the popularity of corruption, the lack of social welfare, the overload of public health care system, the seriously polluted environment and the obsolete educated system are the most significant concerns. Moreover, social inequality is also considered to be the gap of the ideology and the life. Mekong Economic Ltd. (2005) indicated that inequality in Vietnam is not only widening the gap between rural and urban but also increasing within such areas.

By the time of its democratization, Poland had been by The Program of Support for East European Democracy (SEED program), a program run by the US. The support had focused on structural adjustment; private sector development; trade and investment; education, cultural and scientific activities, and other assistant programs (SEED, 1989). Supports from the West, by any mean, have significantly participated in the changes of Poland to be a democracy country.

Different methods but similar purposes, the West has also consciously and unconsciously involved to the proliferation of democratic thinking in Vietnam. This country today is known as one of the rapist developed countries in term of using the Internet. The country is also in the top five countries of facebook penetration worldwide, and top five in the region for twitter penetration (Roque, 2015). This results in the increased exposure of citizens to various new ideologies and conceptions, including freedom and democracy.

Besides, The Ecomomist (2015) said that Vietnam now has become one of South-East Asia’s “most wired societies”. Consequently, there is the proliferation of political commentary, especially on Vietnamese-language Facebook pages. Moreover, the West and the US try to promote democratic values by using human rights and religious freedom in Vietnam (Thayer, 2015).

Obviously, Vietnam today has some similar political conditions with Poland in the late of 1980, especially with regards to the staleness of the ideology and the impacts of democratic countries. These conditions, consequently, can be significant motivation to change the social and political system.

Poland: precedent success
Poland is not an outstanding case of democratic transition through modernization. According to Enriquez (2012) there are three main traits of democratic transition in Poland, with regard to the arose out of a people’s opposition movement that developed around the Solidarity movement to oppose the socialist system, the importance of religion and the Catholic Church and the role played by the army. These conditions is also affirmed by Merce and Alfonso (n.d) that the role of Catholic Church, civil society and primary position of military lead to “a difference to the regime’s decision to initiate liberalization” (p.12). These authors concluded that democratization in Poland in the late 1980 was activated by social pressure and by the inability of the ruling regime to effectively control these pressures.

Vietnam today has reached some indicators of modernization (Hiep, 2014). However, his comparative cases of Vietnam and China indicated that the time for democratization has not yet come. So, based on present status quo, is Vietnam enough politic conditions to democratize?

Poland’s yesterday may not Vietnam’s tomorrow
First, Enriquez (2012) and Merce and Alfonso (n.d) argued that society where a people’s opposition movement opposed the current political system is one of the main straits in Poland’s democratization. In the late of 1980, the movement mobilized many different layers of the population joining to the demonstrations on the streets. It was a remarkable difference between Poland and other countries in the Soviet bloc at that time.

For a present Vietnam, there is the lack of opposing politic forces. In the country, the debate of whether Vietnam has an actual civil society is controversial. Thayer (2009) contended that civil society in the country need to preface by “so-called” or “put NGO in quotation marks” (p.9). Moreover, there are “mass organizations” and “umbrella organizations” established by Vietnamese government to be the hub of so-called Vietnamese civil society organizations (Lux and Straussman, 2004). These authors affirmed that most of VNGOs are registered under the Vietnamese Union for Science and Technology Associations and Vietnam Union of Friendship Organizations. Being a government-organized professional unions and a nation-wide socio-political organization respectively, these two organizations are so-called “state-lead” civil society organizations.

Furthermore, the state has governed civil society organizations in Vietnam by a legal framework. Since 2010, the Decision of the Prime Minister has controlled civil society organizations by strictly limit 317 specially approved topics, which are allowed to scientifically or technically research by independent think tanks and non-profit associations (Kepa, 2013). Therefore, these organizations and think tank cannot “publicity discuss topics that are not explicitly sanctioned”, including political sensitive topics such as democracy, religious freedom and human rights in the country (p.3).

Along side with the limitations of civil society, Vietnam state has successful repressed opposition political and social movements. Thayer (2009) affirmed that political movement and religious groups advocating of human rights, democratization and religious freedom has been marginalized by who study civil society in Vietnam. In other word, these organizations are not legitimately recognized as Vietnam civil society ones. For instant, the Bloc 8460 and Viet Tan party that “mounting challenges to the hegemony of Vietnam Communist Party”, are not considered to be legitimate socio-politic forces in the country. There is almost no information regarding the Bloc 8406 in state media in Vietnam. Its leaders such as Nguyen Van Dai and Le Thi Cong Nhan were sentenced by “propaganda to against Vietnamese state” (Duc Du and Cam Thuy, 2007). In a separate incident, the operations of Viet Tan’s members are called as “terrorist plot” on the state media (Quoc Thang, 2012).

Similarly, according to BBC (2006a) the Democratic Party of Vietnam and Social Party of Vietnam were established in 1944, jointed to the freedom election for the first Parliament in 1946. Although somewhat formalistic, the existence of the two parties is considered to be necessary for national policies. In 1988, with the cause of “finishing historical mission”, the two parties announced to be self- dissolution. Pham The Duyet, the former Chairman of the Committee of Vietnam Fatherland Front, affirmed that “There is no opportunity for pluralism, multi-parties in Vietnam” (2006b). As a consequence, it is difficult to develop political and social forces to oppose with the communist authorities.

Second, the important of religion and Catholic Church in democratic transition in Poland is undeniable as argued by Enriquez (2012) and Merce and Alfonso (n.d). The authors explained that the political strength of the Catholic Church in the country is considered to be the main motivation of the opposition movement, which can be solely developed in Poland. Poland is the most orthodox Catholic society in Europe. The Catholic Church, hence, played a major role in politics. In all events, the Church takes on a role of a force “to be reckoned with in politics” and “definitely has an influence on the way Polish people vote” (p.22). Poland has been identified as the only case that the Church can play an important role in promoting democratization.

By contrast, there is the lack of a unified religious sphere in Vietnam. In spite of knowing as the country of the majority of population who worship Buddhism, many people are non-religious. To illustrate how religion varies in Vietnam, United Nation (2014) stated that over a half of the population is Mahayana Buddhist, while approximately 7% of the population is practicing Roman Catholic. There are many other religions such as Khmer, Cao Dai, Hoa Hao, Prostestants, Cham, and Muslim, Jews, Mormons and Islam. As a result, the religion in Vietnam is relatively dispersed.

With regards to the power of the Buddhism, the Buddhist Sangha of Vietnam has been constituted as “the only organization of the Vietnamese Buddhists” as stated by The Government Committee for Religious Affairs (n.d.). The Shangha is unified from 9 separated Buddhism organizations in the country, operates under the Vietnamese Front Fatherland. It seems to be a well-organized religious institution. However, the state also tries to govern the operations of religion by Ordinance on Belief and Religion adopted on 18 June 2004 and the Decree no. 92, of 8 November 2012 (United Nations Human Rights, 2014). Moreover, other contentment is the direct intervention of the communist government to the religious practices, which leads to the decadence of the Vietnamese Buddhism (BBC, 2013). Many other critics called that the Buddhism in Vietnam is the “state-owned one” (Phuong Ngan, 2013 and Vien Dong, 2014). Visibly, the Vietnamese state has also involved and dominated one of the most important religious organizations. Consequently, it seems that there is the lack of a powerful and independent religious force, which can take on a role of mobilizing people joining to social movements against the government in Vietnam today.

Finally, the played by military was significantly important to the democratization in Poland. After joining to the Warsaw Pact, according to Enriquez (2012) and Merce and Alfonso (n.d.), Polish armies were badly paid and had very little social prestige because the people realized that they were not responsible for defending national security and independence. Consequently, the dissatisfaction of the military toward the communist authorities also increased. The Army at this time, hence, played an important role in political life, even acted as a “driver of reform” (p.23)
The Vietnam’s People Army is named with “people” with the means of protecting the people. The army is always proud of its “people” origin. Nong Duc Manh, the former General Secretary of the Vietnamese Communist Party also affirmed “the revolute and heroic people produce the revolute and heroic people army” (Vietbao, 2004). But the slogan of the Vietnam’s People Army is “Quân đội ta trung với Đảng, hiếu với dân, sẵn sàng chiến đấu hy sinh vì độc lập tự do của Tổ quốc […]” (Loyal to the Party, devoted to the people, our army is ready to fight and scarify for the independence and freedom of the nation […]” as stated by Ho (1964) and Truong (2012). Obviously, the protection of the communist party is the most priority in the tasks of the army in the country. Moreover, Hiep (2014) indicated that in spite of no clear announcement of national budget for internal security, there are some indications showed how Vietnamese communist party has relied on the police and army to protect the regime. For example, a significant number of seats in the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) Central Committee are reserved for representatives from the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Public Security as cited by Le. In particular, he indicated that 26/175 full members, equal to 14.8% of the VCP Central Committee in the Party’s Congress in 2011 were belonged to or were associated with these two ministries as stated by Hiep (2014). In addition, the army enjoys their distinct benefits by using both political and economic powers. The government and the VCP even cannot completely control these benefits and powers (BBC, 2015).

Moreover, Tiananmen Square massacre is known as a precedent case of using army to repress the democratic movement. Although the Chinese government has always denied the involvement of army in the incident in 1989, many evidence showed that Bejing used “hard solutions” to deal with the “pro-democratization demonstration” (Le, 2013). The Times also reported a day after that “in the early hours of June 4, 50 trucks and as many as 10,000 troops rumbled into the streets” (Raynan, 2014). Hence, it is completely possible that the army in a communist nation can turn to fire the people. As a result, no one can confirm that there will be no similar armed solutions using by the communist government to confront with the future democratic movements in Vietnam.

Conclusion
Democracy, as contented by many scholars, is a universal value. However, in a dictatorship regime, it can be consider as a threat. The authorities in these countries may aware that they are employing an obsolete ideology. However, they still keep holding the power as long as they can, in order to protect their own political and economic interests. Therefore, there is no easy and random democratic transition in the history of mankind. In Vietnam, on the one hand there have been some necessary conditions for democracy, especially in term of the growing levels of wealth, industrialization, education and urbanization as indicated by Hiep (2014). On the other hand, the socialism regime has exposed their irreparable weaknesses. However, democratization is likely to be required a longer timing the country. The authorities also seek to maintain the powers and privileges in the country. Comparing with Poland, Vietnam can see itself in the lack of sufficient conditions for democratic transition. That is also useful reference for the political forces seeking to democratize the country.

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